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  The economic theory of exhaustible resources, beginning with the seminal work of 
Hotelling (1931), has been primarily concerned with the optimal extraction of a fixed reserve 
base over time. Although a considerable amount of research has been dedicated to the optical 
extraction of exhaustible resource, theoretical studies on the exploration process are relatively 
few in number. Among these handful contributions we might mention Uhler (1976, 1979), 
Pindyck (1978, 1980), Gilbert (1979,1981), Deshmukh and Pliska (1980,1985), Arrow and 
Chang (1982), Pesaran (1990) and Quyen (1989,1991). However, the question of reserve 
discoveries under asymmetric information has largely been neglected. Gaudet, Lasserre, and 
Long (1995) have studied optimal nonrenewable resource royalty contracts when the extracting 
agent has private information on costs assuming that the private information is not correlated 
over time. Osmundsen (1998) has developed a model of dynamic exhaustible natural resource 
taxation, subject to private information about reserves when the private information parameter is 
inter-temporally correlated. But, none of the above studies has taken the exploration issue in 
consideration. The objective of this study is to develop a theoretical model for exploration of 
exhaustible resource under asymmetric information. An exploration program is a search for mineral deposits whose number, sizes, and 
locations are all uncertain. The objective of exploration is to find new reserves in order to meet 
the demand for minerals. Typically, in the developed countries, the exclusive right to search for 
and extract minerals takes the form of lease over the life of the mine to a private firm or 
individual (Gaudet, Lasserre, and Long, 1995) and the leases are given out through auctions. 
However, there are many instances, especially in developing countries, where there is no well-
behaved auction market and leases are given out in some form of contracts. For example, the 
government of Bangladesh invites International Oil Companies (IOCs)  for the exploration and 
extraction of its natural gas. Typically the government signs Product Sharing Contracts (PSC) 
with a firm for exploration and extraction of the natural gas. A typical PSC recovers firm’s 
exploration and extraction costs and shares the profit gas. In most of the cases exploration and 
extraction take place in a two-stage process. This paper considers only the first stage of the two-
stage process. 
In the case of exploration with cost recovery, if the exploration costs are perfectly known 
to both the owner of the resource and the exploring firms, then the solution to the problem is not 
very complicated. In practice, however, exploration costs are private information of the 
exploring firms. This gives rise to the problem of adverse selection. In this paper, we attempt to 
develop a model for exploration under cost recovery contract employing the Principle-Agent 
Theory. Defining the discovery and exploration cost functions the next sections outlines the basic 
framework of the model. Section three discusses the optimal contracts under symmetric as well 
as asymmetric information cases assuming non-stochastic stock of reserves. The case of 
stochastic stock of reserves is analyzed in section four. The final section draws conclusions and 
gives directions for future studies of optimal exploration and extraction contracts.  
II. The Basic Theoretical Framework 
  Let us begin by first considering a non-stochastic stock of discoverable reserves, which is 
a function of exploration effort only. The exploring firm incurs cost by exerting exploration 
effort. It reports the stock of newly discovered stock of reserves and the total exploration cost to 
the government. The government, the owner of the resources, covers the cost of the firm in the 
form of a transfer payment. So, the firm’s objective is to maximize profit from exploration, 
which is the difference between the transfer payment received from the government and its total 
cost. On the other hand, the government maximizes social welfare, which is the value of the 
stock of discovered reserves plus the profit of the exploring firm. If the resource price, the stock 
of reserves and the cost of exploration are perfectly observable by both the government and the 
exploring firm, then the solution takes the form of a static optimization problem. The 
government therefore offers a transfer payment to the firm for a given level of effort such that 
the firm is left with zero profit. 
  In practice, however, the owner of the resources or the government does not know the 
true cost of exploration. This asymmetry of information creates a situation where adverse 
selection may occur, which should be solved by employing the well-known principal-agent 
theory tools. Throughout this paper we will think of the government being the principal and the 
exploring firm being the agent. But we need to define the stock discovery function and the cost 
function first. 
The Discovery Function 
While explaining his model of petroleum exploration, Uhler (1979) states that current 
exploration effort and the size of undiscovered reserves are important factors in explaining the discovery rate although the geological knowledge is also important. The greater the geological 
knowledge the higher will be the discovery rate for any given amount of effort and undiscovered 
reserves. On the other hand, for any given level of current search effort and geological 
knowledge, the larger the stock of undiscovered reserves the higher is the rate of discovery. But, 
the initial stock of undiscovered reserves is not observable. Uhler (1979) proposes an observable 
variable, which can be used as a substitute for the undiscovered resource stock. He specifies that 
current exploration effort has four primary effects. First, it directly affects the rate at which 
reserves are discovered. Second, it reduces the stock of undiscovered reserves to the extent that it 
results in discoveries. Third, it adds to the geological knowledge. Finally, current effort increases 
the stock of cumulative effort, by definition. Thus, the stock of cumulative effort is inversely 
related to the stock of undiscovered reserves and may act as a substitute for it in the specification 
of the production function.  
Using the arguments above, Uhler (1979) establishes the relationship between the 
discovery rate and the stock of exploration effort. He argues that, for initial values of the stock of 
exploration effort,  x, the effect of geological knowledge dominates the effect of reduced 
reserves and the discovery rate rises with increases in x. But as x increases, the effect of 
reduced reserves begins to dominate the effect of additional geological knowledge and the 
discovery rate begins to fall. Thus the marginal product of cumulative effort is at first positive 
but becomes negative after some critical value of x is reached. Uhler (1979) specifies the 
functional relationship as follows: 
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where  x v & = , and  A,  β ρ,  and k  are parameters. This relationship states that for a given level 
of current effort, the reserves discovery rate increases until x reaches k , at which point it declines asymptotically toward the horizontal axis. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between 
























  Equation (1) has the advantage that it is reasonably flexible since its centrality and spread 
change with variations in the parameters. On the other hand, it tends to overstate the discovery 
rate for very low values of  x since at  0 = x ,  0 ) , ( > v x S . However, for a single period case we 
can simplify the discovery function as: 
 
ρ Ax x S = ) (  ;    for    1 0 < < ρ        ( 2 )  
The single period discovery function in (2) represents a generalization of the relationship 
between the stock of newly discovered reserves and the level of current exploratory effort  

















      
The Exploration Cost Function 
  Following Uhler (1979), we assume that the exploring firm’s single period cost function 
is given by some function  ) , ( i i x C θ , where  i x  is the level of effort exerted by firm i and  i θ  is a 
cost parameter known only to the exploring firm. The parameter  i θ  can reflect various aspects of 
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Hence the marginal cost is  
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The fact that total and marginal cost move in the same direction when  i θ changes guarantees that 
the static single crossing property is satisfied. However, to keep things simple we will assume 
that  0 = b . So the cost function in this analysis takes the form of 
  i i i i x x C θ θ = ) , (          ( 4 )  
We assume that both  i θ and  i x  are known to the firm and only  i x  is known to the government. 
However, the government knows the density of  i θ which is given by  0 ) ( > i f θ . For simplicity 
we assume that  ] , [ 2 1 θ θ θ∈ , i.e. there are only two types of firm,  1 θ  and  2 θ  with  2 θ  >  1 θ . We 
also assume that π being the probability that the firm is low-cost type and  π − 1  being the 
probability that the firm is high-cost type. 
  Let us assume that the government makes the transfer payment  i T  to the firm for exerting 
effort  i x . So, an exploring firm earns profit,  i i i i x T θ − = Π . Since the principal does not know the true  i θ, she is facing a mechanism design problem by which she can extract the true 
information about the  i θ.  Here, we intend to model the problem through direct mechanism 
design so that the government can set a transfer payment schedule  2 , 1 , = i Ti , that maximizes 
expected social welfare. Social welfare can be taken as a weighted sum of government revenue 
minus transfer payment and producer’s surplus. To simplify the problem, we assume that the 
country is a price taker in the resource market which is exogenously given and  1 = s P . Thus we 
may write the social welfare as  
  Π + − = α T x S W ) (          ( 5 )  
where  
) , ( θ x C T − = Π          ( 6 )  
Following Gaudet et al., we adopt the standard assumption that  1 0 < <α : a dollar in 




III. The Model of Exploration with Cost Recovery 
The Symmetric Information Case 
Before going to solve for the optimal contract scheme under asymmetric information, we 
first derive the properties of cost recovery schedule, which maximizes social welfare in the case 
where both the principal and the agent have perfect information about the cost structure. This 
symmetric information case is a useful benchmark, as it yields the first best solution to the 
problem. Assume that before the exploration takes place, the firm reveals the exact value of  i θ to 
the government. The government then wishes to maximize 
Π + − = Π + − = α α
ρ T x A T x S W
x
Max ) ( 
subject to  
  x T x C T θ θ − = − = Π ) , ( 
 
In this case, the government will bind the firm on zero profit since there is no asymmetry about 
the cost information. Hence,  ) , ( θ x C T − = Π  =  0, as a result  x x C T θ θ = = ) , ( .   
Assuming  2
1 = ρ , and substituting for the constraint, the maximization problem takes the form 
  x x A W
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The first order condition is just the value of marginal product equals marginal cost condition, 
where marginal cost is replaced by the marginal exploration cost. This condition gives the 
optimal efforts, transfer receipts, and stock of newly discovered reserves for both of the firm as 
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∗ ∗ > 2 1 S S .    (9) 
 
The government will, therefore, maximize social welfare by offering the first best contracts 
) , ( 1 1
∗ ∗ T x  and  ) , ( 2 2
∗ ∗ T x . 
 
The Asymmetric Information Case 
  Let us now turn to the second best situation in which the efficiency parameter,  i θ , is not 
known to the government. The government now only knows that the probability of a farm being 
low-cost type is π . If the government offers the first best contracts  ) , ( 1 1
∗ ∗ T x , ) , ( 2 2
∗ ∗ T x , the 
low-cost type firm will not choose  ) , ( 1 1
∗ ∗ T x  but  ) , ( 2 2
∗ ∗ T x  since 
  0 ) (
4 4 4















x C T  
But the high-cost type firm will still choose  *) *, ( 2 2 T x  since 
  0 ) (
4 4 4















x C T . 
Thus the two types of firms are not separated anymore. The government, however, will 
anticipate this opportunistic behavior of the low-cost type firm and will try to separate the firms 
by designing a contract schedule such that the firms find it in their best interests to reveal the true 
value of  i θ . In order to design a direct truthful mechanism where the firms reveal their true θ , 
the government solves the following problem.   ] ) ( )[ 1 ( ] ) ( [
,
2 2 2 1 1 1
2 1
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  0 2 2 2 ≥ − x T θ       ( I R 2) 
  2 1 2 1 1 1 x T x T θ θ − ≥ −      ( I C 1)  
  1 2 1 2 2 2 x T x T θ θ − ≥ −    (IC2) 
The first two constraints are the individual rationality or participation constraints, which 
guarantee that each type of firm accepts the contract designated for it. The latter two constraints 
are the incentive compatibility constraints, which states that each firm prefers the contract 
designed for it. It can be shown easily that only (IR2) and (IC1) are active constraints and we can 
neglect (IR1) and (IC2). Thus from (IR2) we have 
2 2 2 x T θ = , 
and, from (IC2) we have 
  1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 ) ( x x x x x T T θ θ θ θ θ θ + Π = + − = − + =  
where  2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( x x x x x T θ θ θ θ θ θ θ − = − + − = − = Π . Moreover, adding up (IC1) and 
(IC2) and solving for  1 x  and  2 x  we can show that  2 1 x x ≥ . Thus, the monotonicity condition also 
holds. Substituting (IR2) and (IC1) in the objective function the maximization problem takes the 
form of 
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We see that 
o
1 1 x x =
∗  but 
o
2 2 x x >
∗ .  It follows that 
∗ < 2 2 T T
o  and 
∗ < 2 2 S S
o .  So there is a 
distortion in the contract for the high-cost type firm. Compared to the symmetric case, lower 
level of exploring effort is allowed here for the high-cost type firm. High-cost type allocation is 
lowered to restrict the rent accrues to the low-cost type. The high-cost type allocation is distorted 
in such a way that the expected social gain from increasing one unit of effort for the high-cost 
type is exactly offset by the resulting social welfare loss. For the low-cost type firm, however, 
there is no distortion in the contract. Thus, in the case of adverse selection, the low-cost (more 
efficient) firm gets an efficient allocation and the high-cost (less efficient) firm gets a sub-
efficient allocation. As a result, the low cost type firm earns a positive surplus (informational 
rent) and the high-cost type firm gets zero surplus. 
It should also be noted here that if  1 = α , then the optimal contracts take the form of 
those in the symmetric case. That is if a dollar in government revenue is valued as the same as a 
dollar that remains as profits in the hand of the firm, then it is optimal to offer symmetric information case contracts even if there exists asymmetry about the cost information. Thus, α  
plays a significant role in this analysis. 
  
IV. The Case of Stochastic Stock of Reserves 
So far our analysis is based on the assumption that the stock of reserves is non-stochastic. 
In reality, however, the number and sizes of the stocks in a region are most likely to be uncertain. 
Arrow and Chang (1982) as well as Quyen (1991) assumed that the number of deposits existing 
in any unit area of the region follow a Poission distribution with a known parameter. Here we are 
concerned about the uncertain size of the stock only. Let us assume that the probability of 
discovering a stock of size S  is λ  ) 1 0 ( < < λ , which is a function of the effort level such that 
probability of discoveringS  increases with exerted effort. Given a specific functional form of 
) (x λ  we can solve for the optimal contracts following the procedure above. Since the specific 
functional form of  ) (x λ  is not known, the best we can do is try to solve for the optimal contracts 
following  the general functional form of all of the functions.  In that case, the government 
maximizes social welfare solving the following problem. 
] ) ( ) ( )[ 1 ( ] ) ( ) ( [
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  ) , ( ) , ( 1 2 2 1 1 1 θ θ x C T x C T − ≥ −     (IC1)  
  ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 1 2 2 2 θ θ x C T x C T − ≥ −     (IC2) Again, it can be shown that only (IR2) and (IC1) are active constraints and we can neglect 
(IR1) and (IC2). Thus from (IR2) we have 
) , ( 2 2 2 θ x C T = , 
and, from (IC2) we have 
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where  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 θ θ θ x C x C x C T − = − = Π . Moreover, adding up (IC1) and (IC2) and 
solving for  1 x  and  2 x  we can show that  2 1 x x ≥ , i.e., the monotonicity condition also holds. 
Substituting  1 T  and  2 T  in the objective function the maximization problem can be stated as: 
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Again, the second first order condition implies that the allocation for the high-cost type 
firms should be distorted in order to restrict the rent accrues to the low-cost type. Compared to 
the case of symmetric information about the cost structure, for the high-cost type firms the level 
of effort should be lowered in such a way that the marginal social benefit is exactly equal to the marginal social loss. There is no distortion in the contract for the low-cost type firms. However, 
in the case of stochastic stock of reserves, optimal allocation of efforts also depends on  ) (x λ . 
  
V. Conclusions 
  A model for optimal exploration contract with cost recovery under asymmetric 
information is developed both for non-stochastic and stochastic stock of reserves. In both of the 
cases it is found that a sub-efficient allocation for the high-cost type firms is optimal from the 
social point of view. However, for a clear understanding of the stochastic case we need a specific 
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